In order for the Marine Aviation Logistic Support Program to remain effective, meet current needs, and future warfighting doctrine, the component programs must be analyzed in relation to each other, and modern business practices applied to develop a more effective aviation logistics system.
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Theory of Constraints 13. positioned Force (MPF) program. 4 These sub-programs enable aviation logistics to rapidly deploy and sustain a deployed MAGTF ACE as well as support day-to-day operations at home.
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MALSP began in the early 1980s with the goal to organize aviation logistics into predetermined notional support packages called Contingency Support Packages (CSP) for rapid deployment. Deployment tailoring must be pre-planned since aviation supply does not possess War Reserve Material (WRM), and the aviation logistics spare parts and repair material used for deployment is the same as that used to maintain aircraft in garrison on a daily basis. The need to develop a systematic plan for deployment of aviation logistic support was envisioned in order to develop support packages that could be designed and measured in terms of people, spare parts, support equipment, and facilities (Mobile Maintenance Facilities (MMFs)). Prior to MALSP there was no standard method of task-organizing aviation logistics support and the experience of the unit supply and/or maintenance officer was the basis for decision making as to what assets to take when organizing for deployment. As a result, the time required to assemble aviation logistics (AVLOG) support packages exceeded all other phases of task-organizing an ACE, resulting in AVLOG support that was neither responsive nor effective. The second element of MPF is the T-AVB program which is comprised of two ships, the USNS Curtis and USNS Wright. These ships are converted 1969 vintage commercial container vessels that were modified in the mid-1980s to transport intermediate aircraft maintenance and aviation supply support to a contingency environment. These ships fill the strategic lift void that Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) cannot meet. 11 The capabilities of the two T-AVB ships significantly reduce the airlift required to transport maintenance facilities, support equipment, parts and personnel into theatre, and serve as logistic force multipliers that offer maximum flexibility. 12 The T-AVB ships are designed to be activated in support of MEB or 6 MEF operations with a task organized MALS aboard consisting of MMFs, SE, spare parts, and skilled personnel for support of the deployed aircraft mix.
The current method of employing aviation logistics for a major contingency requires existing aviation material in the CSPs of the MALS to be embarked on the T-AVB ships that arrive in theatre after 30 days of aircraft deployment. Once embarked, the T-AVB, with its detachment of Marines from the various home base MALS, sail into the operational theatre to provide intermediate level aviation logistics support via one of three methods of employment:
operational mode, transport mode, and combination mode, based on the number of MMFs being transported. In the operational mode a fixed number of MMFs can be deployed with electrical power and operate as an Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) afloat. The transport mode allows more MMFs to be loaded aboard for transport and off-loaded at a secure port, then reestablish as a MALS ashore. The combination mode allows a portion of the IMA afloat to operate with the remainder un-powered for transport then off-load and re-establish as a MALS ashore. The use of the T-AVB ships complements MALSP by providing packaged logistic support in-theatre to specific mixes of aircraft for a deployment involving contingency operations or exercises for a determined duration.
Warfighting Concepts
The Marine Corps' future warfighting concepts require aviation logistics to plan, organize, and equip for the future. In order to project and sustain Marine forces, logistics must be provided independent of host nations and against distant objectives across the breadth and width of theater operations. For aviation logistics to accomplish the support task of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), the Marine Corps will rely heavily on seabasing to reduce the requirement for port facilities and/or host nation support. For seabased logistics to become a reality, the Marine Corps will have to develop a new generation of maritime pre-positioned ships and the ability to move material to and form those ships while at sea. Rather than off-loading large quantities of supplies and equipment ashore, logistics operations will deliver tailored support packages from the seabase or from small detachments ashore to widely dispersed, highly mobile combat forces operating hundred of miles inland. 13 The Maritime Pre-positioned ForceFuture (MPF-F) ships being designed now will replace the current fleet of pre-positioned vessels by combining the capabilities of the T-AVB ships with the current MPS ships and must include a flight deck capability to provide a capable seabase that reduces the requirement for in-theatre ports and airfields.
Statement of the Problem
MALSP was designed during the era of the Cold War to support a major regional conflict.
As originally designed, MALSP is too large, too heavy, and too expensive to move into theatre, and requires a large footprint ashore in a relatively benign environment. Since the conclusion of operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, articles and research papers on the topic of aviation logistics have focused on the individual component programs of MALSP. Recent operations have shown a need for an aviation logistics capability that is more rapidly deployable, has reduced transportation requirements, and has greater flexibility. The leadership within the aviation logistics community must develop a clearly defined goal and concept of operation.
Other key considerations are that not every contingency can be supported by MPF ships due to 13 Department of the Navy (N78), Naval Aviation Vision (Washington, D.C., May 2003), 34.
8 port facility location and/or a benign port environment for offload; current support packages are not adequate for short intense combat operations followed by sustained lower intensity operations; and lastly, recent operations illustrate that MALSP must not only be responsive to composite squadrons or groups, but to single type aircraft deployments in squadrons or detachments from squadrons.
Thesis Statement
In order for the Marine Aviation Logistic Support Program to remain effective and meet the developing operational warfighting doctrine, the component programs must be analyzed in relation to each other and modern business practices applied in order to develop a more effective aviation logistics system.
Chapter II
Transforming Aviation Logistics "One of the constants of warfare is that the outcome of warfare is greatly influenced by the success or failure of logistics." 14 There are many challenges and technology limitations associated with developing a large seabased force that can allow all elements of the MAGTF to conduct sustained operations from ships to the objective area. For aviation logistics one of the most difficult hurdles will be adequate spares parts and adequate lift to transport that material form the seabase to shore and United States based depots. 15 The level of logistics support required to sustain the MAGTF may over-stress the seabase unless the leadership within the Marine Corps aviation logistic community adopts proven business methods to configure and transform the organization, personnel skills, and aviation maintenance support concepts.
It is not practical to pre-stock adequate aviation specific parts on ships due to cost, life limits, and configuration management requirements for safety of flight. This factor will require the ability to move material rapidly from the depots to the seabase. 
Good to Great
The first method that will assist in the transformation of aviation logistics is to develop the culture of great companies as determined by the research findings in the book, Good to Great, according to Professor Jim Collins: "Good is the enemy of great" and the vast majority of companies never become great because the vast majority become quite good and that is their main problem." 17 The research was conducted by setting high benchmarks to identify a set of elite companies that made the leap from good to great and sustained those results for at least 15 years. After the leap the good to great companies generated cumulative stock returns that beat the general stock market by an average of seven times in fifteen years, better than twice the results delivered by a composite index of the world's greatest companies, including Coca Cola, circumstance, rather that Greatness is largely a matter of conscious choice" 18 and from this he determined that the great companies exhibit five key characteristics.
The first characteristic is leadership, which includes having the right people on the team.
The good to great leaders exhibit certain qualities that make them Level 5 leaders, and the businesses that made the transition had the right person in charge of the transition. Level 5 leaders are those that combine extreme personal humility with intense professional will, they shun the attention of celebrity and channel their ambition toward the goal of building a great company. The good to great leaders also understand three simple truths; If you begin with the "who" rather than the "what", you can more easily adapt to a changing world: if you have the right people in the right place, the problem of how to motivate and manage people largely goes away; and if you have the wrong people, it doesn't matter whether you discover the right direction, you still won't have a great company. In order to make the transformation the leader must set the goal and with his team of disciplined people and develop the plan for transformation. Another successful practice of the leaders of these businesses that should be familiar to military leaders is to put the best people on the biggest opportunities, not the problems.
The second characteristic common to making the transition is to have disciplined thought, and the ability to confront the facts. All great companies began the process of finding a path to greatness by confronting the brutal facts of their current reality. Collins found that when a company starts with an honest and diligent effort to determine the truth of its situation, the right truths become self evident. The leader must foster a climate where the truth is heard. One of the primary tasks in taking a company from good to great is to create a culture wherein people have 18 Collins, 30.
a tremendous opportunity to be heard and , ultimately for the truth to be likewise heard. The leader must have faith that the team will prevail in the end. Disciplined thought includes developing a Hedgehog mentality wherein you understand what your organization can be the best at and pursue that. At the same time the leadership of the organization must determine the other activities you perform and may be competent in, but others do better and leave those activities to others to perform for you.
The third characteristic is one of disciplined action, where the company has developed a culture of self-discipline. Collins writes that to create a culture of discipline, successful leaders:
build a culture around the idea of freedom and responsibility within a framework; fill the company's culture with self disciplined people who are willing to go to extreme lengths to fulfill their responsibilities; and avoid confusing a culture of discipline with a tyrannical discipline.
The leader instills an ethic of entrepreneurship.
The fourth characteristic is to think differently about technology. The great organizations think differently than others regarding technology and technological change. They avoid fads and bandwagons that typically arise from new technology, instead becoming pioneers in the application of carefully selected technologies. Leaders of good to great companies respond with thoughtfulness and creativity, driven by a compulsion to turn unrealized potential into results.
They act in terms of what they want to create, and how to improve their companies, relative to an absolute standard of excellence. The great companies avoid technology fads, apply carefully selected technologies, and determine if the technology fits in with the Hedgehog concept.
The fifth concept is known as the "flywheel" and the "Doom Loop", based on the principle where a steady force will move the flywheel and build momentum. Good to great transformations often look like dramatic, revolutionary events to those observing from the outside, but they feel like organic, cumulative processes to people on the inside. Collins writes that the great companies had no name for their transformations, there was no launch event, no tag line, no programmatic feel whatsoever. Each company went through a quiet, deliberate process of figuring out what was needed to be done to create the best future results, then simply took those steps, one by one over time until it hit breakthrough moments. Those who launch radical change programs and wrenching restructurings will almost certainly fail to make the leap from good to great.
Theory of Constraints
Theory Of Constraints (TOC) evolved from the theories and teachings of Dr. Eliyahu M.
Goldratt, a physicist who realized that scientific principles and the rules of logic could be applied to a process in order to provide ongoing improvement for the system as a whole. It has one clear objective: to succeed in achieving more of an organization's goals by focusing on the areas that have a dramatic impact on the whole unit. The TOC philosophy has been applied to many manufacturing businesses around the world by using techniques for identifying constraints within an organization and focusing steps for improving an organization's performance. It is more than a production shop floor "bottleneck" optimization program, it is about making decisions in a fast-paced, ever-changing world. Insight comes from recognizing that diagrams can be made that get at the root cause of an organization's problems. Whatever the nature of business, TOC establishes a framework and suggests methodologies for achieving optimal solutions for any organization.
Theory of Constraints enables an organization to develop a superior system for generating continual logistical improvements. Strategic Planning and Thinking Processes are the vehicle and roadmap for the goal. The process of ongoing improvement provides the leadership with guidelines for identifying chokepoints within the procedures and exploiting these constraints so that maximum output is achieved from the system. Theory of Constraints walks an organization through the crucial stages of a continuous program: the five steps of focusing; the process of change; how to prove effect-cause-effect; and how to invent simple solutions to complex problems.
The core constraint of virtually every organization is that organizations are structured, measured and managed in parts, rather than as a whole. This constraint impacts the organization through lower overall performance results, difficulty in holding a strategic advantage, financial hardships, focus on current emergencies, not meeting customer expectations, constant shifting of constraints, and conflicting views between people in different parts of the organization. Once the barriers that block those parts from working together as an integrated system are removed, significant and sustainable improvement in each and every problem area is the result. A lack of focus can cause increases in inventory, excess time and effort, and limits the productivity of the system as a whole. "The theory of constraints is an approach for enacting a process of continuous improvement that focuses on the factors that limit a systems performance."
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First, TOC requires that the overall goal for the organization as a whole be clearly identified and brought into focus by everyone. Next, the organization sets the course toward the goal through TOC Thinking Processes (TP). Furthermore, these "logic trees" map the path and discover the constraints. TOC identifies poor management practices and processes in an organization and ensures that the leadership recognizes which management approaches are in need of correction. By establishing a process of ongoing improvement, you derive a superior system for generating continual logistical improvements is derived. "Determination or recognition of a system's goal is the first and most critical task of anyone who wants to improve a system." 20 Systems. Systems are composed of interdependent parts, and organizations functions as whole systems. "For our purposes, we'll consider a system to be a number of connected or interrelated elements that could be seen as working together for the overall objective of the whole." 21 TOC is designed to improve the capacity of a system. "A system takes inputs of some kind, acts on them in some way, and produces outputs. These outputs are supposed to have a greater value than the sum of the inputs, so the system might be said to add value to the inputs as it turns them into outputs." 22 
Constraints. Identifying constraints is critical in TOC methodology. What is a constraint?
A constraint is a bottleneck or chokepoint, or "Anything that limits the organization from achieving higher performance versus its goal." 23 TOC describes when "something is constraining your system -it keeps it from realizing its maximum potential." 24 If the system is viewed as a chain, then the weakest link would be the constraint. "It prevents us from satisfying a necessary condition or reaching our goal, or from reaching it more quickly or decisively.
Moreover, the constraints in any system are the factors that determine how much the system can accomplish" 25 20 "wringing every bit of capability out of the constraining component as it currently exists," so that maximum output is achieved from the system. 26 TOC enacts continuous process improvement and focuses on the factors that limit a systems performance. 27 Typically, the individual at the local level is not supporting the greater good. Good local performance always hurts global performance, "because of interdependence and variation, the optimum performance of a system as a whole is not the same as the sum of the local optima." 28 One must ensure that local actions are in alignment with global performance. Systems are like chains or networks of chains, and like a chain, a system's performance is limited by the performance of its weakest link. 29 The first step toward improving the system's ability to achieve the goal encompasses the unit's leadership agreeing on that ultimate goal.
Strategic Planning. Once the vision is defined, a strategy for how the organization will achieve its goal must be defined. This leads to a strategic plan focused on a specific goal. Three questions must be asked: What is the goal? What is the current status? What is the magnitude 26 Dettmer, Breaking the Constraints, 1-7. 27 Dettmer, Eliyahu M. Goldratt's Theory of Constraints, 1-9. 28 Ibid. 1-8. 29 Ibid. iv. Throughput. Throughput is how we get to the goal. As the vehicle to the organization's goal, TOC's conceptualization of throughput places priority on identifying where and why delays occur in a system and on ascertaining how to alter the process to reduce or eliminate delays. 32 In other words, it is the rate at which the system achieves its goal through production and distribution, which can be beneficial to commercial industry or military logistical systems.
As such, it measures the total volume of production through a facility. Figure 2 (page 23)
illustrates throughput as the instrument to take the system (supply chain) to its goal of effecting aircraft readiness.
Thinking Processes. Once the goal and the vehicle to get there are decided upon a course must be set to travel to the goal. Thinking Processes (TP) help map the course toward achieving the goal. The TOC thinking process is composed of five logical tools: the Current Reality Tree (CRT), the Conflict Resolution Diagram (CRD), the Future Reality Tree (FRT), the Prerequisite 30 Dettmer, Eliyahu M. Goldratt's Theory of Constraints, 1-5. 31 Goldratt. Theory of Constraints, 3-4. 32 Chakravory and Verhoeven, Learning the theory of constraints with a simulation game, 3.
Tree (PRT) and the Transition Tree. 33 For the purpose of this essay, simplicity, and to serve as examples to reinforce these concepts, I will only focus on the CRT and FRT.
An organization uses the logic trees to comprehend the way business is currently accomplished, identify the Undesirable Effects (UDE) and their root causes, and implement positive change. Logic trees use blocks to describe causes that bring about a logical effect. The CRT helps determine how the system is currently operating and the undesirable effects. "The CRT is a problem analysis tool that helps us examine the cause-and-effect logic behind our current situation." 34 As a result, the FRT demonstrates what the system strives to achieve in a cause and effect in a diagram ( Figure 3 ). This process involves using Thinking Processes (TP)
or logic trees to comprehend the way business is accomplished today. Once the constraint is identified, its elimination would be pursued. From the FRT, a constraint is determined, and agreed upon by the organization's leadership and key personnel.
The Five Focusing Steps 1. Identification. Identify the system's constraint(s). The first step is self-explanatory.
The constraint must be identified and then prioritized according to its effect on the system. Constraints can be categorized as either physical or policy constraints. Physical Constraints are those things in the system that limit the production capability. They can be resources that are in short supply, vendor limitations, the demand for the product, or long processing time, which affect the flow of material to the system. Policy constraints include all rules levied on the organization by management that limit the system.
The Exploitation
Step. Decide how to Exploit the system's constraint(s). "By 'exploit'
Goldratt means we should wring every bit of capability out of the constraint as it currently exists.
In other words, 'what can we do to get the most out of this constraint without committing to potentially expensive changes or upgrades?" 35 Most organizations wish to get rid of the constraint once it has been identified; instead, the system's constraints should be fully exploited so that the maximum output is achieved. In most cases it is not possible to easily or immediately eliminate the constraint. We have to live with the constraint that limits the performance of the organization. Nonproductive time for the constraint is the same as nonproductive time for the whole system. On the surface it appears that the easiest type of constraint to exploit is a policy constraint since the policies that govern an organization are controlled or influenced by management, but these constraints are the least obvious since they are imbedded in the structure of an organization. The decision of how to exploit the full potential of the constraint will place limits on all other decisions affecting the operation of the system. The constraint is the limiting factor of the system.
The Subordination
Step. Subordinate everything else to the above decision. The subordination step is the most revolutionary step: changing the objective of the non-constraints to support the exploitation of the constraint. If other processes are not directly the constraint, they must be focused to synchronize their efforts around the capacity and pace of the constraint itself. "We adjust the rest of the system to a 'setting' that will enable the constraint to operate at maximum effectiveness." 36 The organization focuses its energies on the productivity of the constraint. For example, if the constraint is in engine production, all non-constraints should be aimed to do things that protect and enable continuous engine productions. Planning the material 35 Ibid. 1-9. 36 Ibid.
requirements carefully to ensure the availability of materials ahead of the constraint is a subordination process of the utmost importance. Subordinate everything else to the above decision.
The Elevation
Step. Elevate the system's constraint(s). The fourth step is the strategic one. A constraint means a limit imposed on the organization. The term "elevate" means to elevate the limit -increase it to a higher level. If we can elevate to reduce the impact of the constraint's limiting effect, the system's performance improves. "It is not until this step that we entertain the idea of major changes to the existing system -reorganization, divestiture, capital improvements, or other substantial system modification." 37 If the constraint can be sufficiently elevated it will eventually be broken, in other words, it no longer limits the systems performance.
When a test-bench is the constraint, purchasing another machine is an obvious step toward elevating the constraint. Moving from one shift to two shifts is another way of elevating the capacity of a constrained resource. "Elevating the constraint means that we take whatever action is required to eliminate the constraint." in the previous steps a constraint has been broken, go back to the first step. The constraint that has been broken in the preceding steps will no longer be the limiting factor in the system, but there will be other constraints on the system. organization improve when the constraint is elevated, then the process in question is a genuine constraint.
The five focusing steps are an ongoing process and a dynamic problem-solving tool. The focusing process is iterative: once a constraint is identified, exploited, and broken, a new constraint is identified and the process continues. Only when you find and fix the weakest link do you find other constraints, and then the organization positions the constraint where they want and can best manage it. "No matter how much effort you put into improving the processes of a system, only the improvement to the weakest link will produce any detectable system improvement." 40 The goals of the organization will drive the decisions of how to manage the system's constraints. 40 Ibid. Preface.
TOC Principles
-Systems thinking is preferable to analytical thinking in managing and solving problems.
-An optimal solution deteriorates over time as the system's environment changes. A process of ongoing improvement is required to update and maintain the effectiveness of a solution.
-If a system is performing as well as it can, not more than one of its component parts will be. If all parts are performing as well as they can, the system as a whole will not be. THE SYSTEM OPTIMA IS NOT THE SUM OF THE LOCAL OPTIMA.
-Systems are analogous to chains. Each system has a "weakest link" (constraint) that ultimately limits the success of the entire system.
-Strengthening any link in a chain other than the weakest one does NOTHING to improve the strength of the whole chain.
-Knowing what to change requires a thorough understanding of the system's current reality. its goal, and the magnitude and direction of the difference between the two.
-Most undesirable effects within a system are caused by a few core problems.
-Core problems are almost never superficially apparent. They manifest themselves through a number of undesirable effects (UDE) linked by a network of cause-and-effect.
-Elimination of individual UDEs gives a false sense of security while ignoring the underlying core problem. Solutions, which do this, are likely to be short-lived. Solution of a core problem simultaneously eliminates all resulting UDEs.
-Core problems are usually perpetuated by a hidden or underlying conflict. Solution of core problems requires challenging assumptions underlying the conflict and invalidating at least one.
-System constraints can either be physical or policy. Physical constraints are relatively easy to identify and simple to eliminate. Policy constraints are usually more difficult to identify and eliminate, but they normally result in a larger degree of system improvement.
-Inertia is the worst enemy of a process of ongoing improvement. Solutions tend to assume a mass of their own which resists further change.
-Ideas are NOT solutions. 
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Chapter III
Recommendations
The Transformation of Aviation Logistics requires the application of continuous process improvement to the Marine aviation logistics system, without requiring additional resources, money, or manpower. The current methods of pursuing efficiency at the expense of effectiveness, and the reactive metrics used to measure combat capability highlight the flaws in the naval aviation logistics methodology to support aircraft. In order to positively influence aviation logistics by improving our support system, which will increase combat readiness, we require a vision and a strategy to get to that goal. The requirements of aviation logistics must be 
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With the decline of manpower as a result of the military drawdown, the Marine Corps needs to consider privatizing more of its organic maintenance support through "contracting out".
In the past, maintenance functions required a military or organic capability because it was combatant in nature, and required potential deployment into harm's way. In light of the directive changing to four years of contractor support for a new weapon system, there exists the opportunity to privatize organic support.
Downsizing has made it a necessity that contractor personnel go to the deployed site to support their weapon systems and perform functions the same as military members. The greatest risk is that the contractor will not be there to perform or will leave when hostilities break out. As Intended to improve aircraft readiness while reducing operating cost and deployment footprint, these concepts are the emerging examples upon which future Marine aviation programs will be modeled.
These new logistic support programs will eliminate repair tasks normally carried out by the MALS. As legacy platforms are phased out, Marine aviation will move to a two-tiered maintenance structure of tactical and depot/contractor levels. What exactly will become of the excess force structure is unclear. There have been various recommendations to have all tactical level logistics support at the organizational level or to consolidate all logistics functions in one command. It is estimated that over 2000 maintenance billets from the current structure will be eliminated. 49 Within the Marine Corps aviation community, there is concern that a large scale reduction to MALS manning would severally restrict the flexibility of the Marine Corps' aviation maintenance capability.
As aircraft age, they become increasingly more difficult to maintain: Aircraft structure and avionics systems degrade through prolonged applications of stress and fatigue. Typically, this results in increased maintenance man-hours per flight hour and decreased aircraft reliability. To reverse this trend, preventive maintenance must be carried out in an effort to stop faults from Another factor that likely will not change in aviation maintenance is that aircraft age, and over time require more maintenance. The I-level is the one organization that is best suited to be flexible and adaptable to the changes in maintenance and logistic support as aircraft age, depot and manufacturer support changes with funding, personnel, and contracts over time.
As the focus of support moves from the O-level to the I-level, the squadrons will retain the flightline servicing, launch, and recovery of aircraft with much smaller line maintenance shops.
Where the I-level role should expand is in the performance of scheduled inspections, modification, and repair of aircraft after mishap or combat damage. The transition to the Integrated Maintenance Concept where depot level maintenance and inspections are performed at the home base, MALS will need to evolve into an organization that supports and deploys detachments with the operational squadrons to maintain aircraft and perform all logistical functions for the squadrons. As part of this effort the I-level of maintenance should focus less on repair of retrograde material and more on repair, preventive maintenance, and inspection of the aircraft and major components, leaving the component re-work to the depot level.
52
Reducing the number of levels that currently perform aviation maintenance would be beneficial because it will increase maintenance effectiveness and efficiency while simultaneously reducing the current logistics footprint and costs. For example, the process of repairing parts, usually done by Marine technicians at the I-level, is eliminated due to delivery of parts from the vendor directly to the squadron. The processes sing of parts, usually done by supply Marines, is eliminated due to delivery of parts from the vendor directly to the squadron. In both situations parts repair, inventory, and delivery is the responsibility of the vendor. The elimination of these two functions removes a layer from the logistics process.
52 Deputy Commandant for Aviation, "Marine Aviation Campaign Plan" 8.
A two-level maintenance concept will also reduce manpower needs, and maintenance and supply effectiveness and efficiency will be increased. Logistics efficiency and effectiveness will benefit through aircraft that incorporate more replaceable components vice a large quantity of smaller piece parts have a smaller inventory to store and keep track of which reduces the logistic footprint. Advanced technology, Rear Admiral Bennitt said, "will minimize maintenance requirements, reduce infrastructure, and lower manning levels due to the development of more reliable, repairable, and automated systems."
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This transition is most apparent with the entry of the MV-22 Osprey, the KC-130J, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft into Marine inventories; these aircraft will be less maintenance and supply intensive than our existing inventory of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, thereby effectively negating the requirement for three levels of support. Data will be downloaded and transmitted to maintenance and supply systems to provide information to technician and logisticians to assess the system's performance, make any adjustments, diagnose malfunctions, order parts, and make repairs. The data also interfaces electronically with the supply source so that the correct part can be identified, ordered, and provided, all without the need for error-prone manual input of data. Compared to the way maintenance is conducted today, newer aircraft technologies offer the convenience of less maintenance and less parts inventory.
The MALS will continue to play a vital role in aviation logistic support to the MAG, but external changes in aviation logistics will affect its role. Design technology plays the biggest role in what maintenance and repair will be done at the MALS level. Computerization and miniaturization will continue to reduce the repair work that can be done in the field, and self diagnosis of faults will allow more predictability of material requirements. I-level maintenance will depend on remove and replace actions rather than troubleshooting, repair and adjustment.
Because of these changes in maintenance there will be greater emphasis on supply issue
retrograde of material and multi-skilled technicians.
One The single biggest benefit of the MALS(F) concept is improved aircraft material condition and therefore, readiness. The sooner a problem is diagnosed and corrected, the less likely it will develop into a serious fault that could adversely affect aircraft readiness. Tables one and two Each squadron has, on average, one hard-down aircraft at all times, and that is often referred to as the "hangar queen", and is cannibalized for parts. It takes great maintenance effort only after several days of dedicated effort, provided the necessary parts can be found is the 
Contingency Support Packages
In order to sustain the ACE from the seabase, resources will be acquired from sources internal or external to the ACE through reach-back capabilities that will ensure accessibility to distant resources and may even employ commercial carriers to expedite deliveries. ACE supply systems will need to connect with Joint, automated systems that can identify, request, acquire, track, receive and distribute resources through total asset visibility. Once located, the ACE will assign assets to move and distribute resources in support of itself and of the MAGTF as a whole.
Deliveries will be tailored into specific support packages that maximize "in-time" delivery and economy of lift. ACE maintenance provides the actions necessary to classify discrepancies, perform necessary repair or modifications, and dispose of unusable material.
A reduction of on-hand spare parts due to on-aircraft monitoring and replacement before failure with just-in-time delivery of parts from the manufacturer or depot will result in a much smaller aviation supply department than the current supply department of the MALS. Increasing need for forward basing of material and integration of joint DoD aviation logistics support will require the CSP's to have greater focus on rapid movement to the theater of operations the spare material required, as well as establishing priority and movement of repair and retrograde material to and from the CONUS supply centers. The RESP should become the focus as the primary building block of the CSP since the requirement for I-level repair is eliminated and the savings in lift required for the MALS MMF's is shifted to more material. The shift in focus to the RESP will drive the requirement to develop smaller, lighter shipping containers that can be moved more readily by a variety of means to forward operating areas.
MPF(F)
The current aviation logistics ships are primarily used for transport of maintenance facilities that perform aviation material repair at sea, pier side, or when offloaded and established at an airfield. The transition to two-level maintenance will have a positive impact on requirements for MPF(F). These changes will require less deployed manpower, facilities, and equipment and replace them with additional assemblies and components for repair of aircraft and major end items such as engines and result in increased need for faster cycle time of retrograde, repair, and return to the seabase. This change in concept will result in a reduction of the logistics footprint which is especially important in the early stages of a conflict when airlift assets are scarce and before a sea-lift bridge can be established. 55 These ships must be capable of supporting the ACE with hangar space for conducting maintenance. The MPF(F) sea-base must support air operations (flight deck, elevator, lighterage and selective offload), and the MV-22/CH-53E must be able to access the sea-base and transport MAGTF supplies. In order to provide maintenance and logistic support for the ACE it must be determined what on aircraft maintenance capabilities will reside on each ship.
Increasing the shelf life of aviation material in order to pre-load and pre-position essential supplies and capabilities aboard the sea-base will support rapid force closure, expeditionary operations, and reconstitution. Follow-on sustainment should be effectively provided by a robust reach back capability that ensures cycle-time of material is less than 30 days to/from any location in the world. The transformation that technology and modern logistic methods bring, will result in less need for I-level maintenance of components in the theatre of operations. This in turn will require increased movement and staging of repair material forward on the MPF-F ships and a theater support base to get items to the seabase, in addition to dedicated transport between the MPF-F ships, theatre support base, and CONUS to maintain a flow of logistic support. As a result, systems that predict, measure force requirements, and prioritize need must be established. 
